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Police Action and the State-Created Danger
Doctrine: a Proposed Uniform Test
Christopher M. Eisenhauer*
Abstract
The state-created danger doctrine provides the basis for a potential
claim when a state actor creates a danger that results in an injury to the
plaintiff. The doctrine may be interpreted as an exception to the general
rule that a state has no duty to protect one private citizen from another.
Because the U.S. Supreme Court has not addressed the issue, many
variations of the state-created danger doctrine exist across the federal
circuits. The resulting lack of uniformity has led to inconsistent results,
promoting unfairness for litigants throughout the country.
This Comment explores the history, objectives, and current
approaches to the state-created danger doctrine. This Comment also
examines the public policy considerations with which the federal circuits
seem to struggle. A recent case involving police action demonstrates the
perils of inconsistency and the need for balance to further the interests of
the public. Finally, this Comment recommends a simplified uniform test
to restore uniformity to the federal circuits.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The state-created danger doctrine, implicated in a substantive due
2
process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 19831 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
has no national standard.3  The doctrine bloomed from a few lines of
dicta in a 1989 U.S. Supreme Court case, DeShaney v. Winnebago.
4
Interpreted by many courts as an exception to the general no-duty rule
for state actors, the doctrine allows for the possibility of holding the state
responsible for creating or increasing a danger to an individual.'
Since 1989, each federal circuit court of appeals has developed its
own interpretation and implementation of the doctrine.6 The circuits'
often contradictory decisions and tests make understanding and applying
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). Section 1983 provides private citizens with a remedy
for constitutional rights violations by individuals acting under the authority of state law.
See Conti, Arming Teachers and School Personnel: The Potential for Civil Liability for
School Districts, 86 PA. B. ASS'N Q. 1, 7 (2015).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
3. DAVID W. LEE, HANDBOOK OF SECTION 1983 LITIGATION 2014, at 65 (2014).
4. See generally DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189
(1989).
5. Id.
6. MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ & JOHN E. KIRKLrN, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS
AND DEFENSES 3-305 (2014).
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the doctrine difficult.7 These different tests offer conflicting guidance to
actors in the public arena.
8
Applying the state-created danger doctrine to police activity
presents additional problems due to competing policy considerations.
9
Police officers, regularly operating in tense and dangerous
circumstances, rightfully must be allowed to do their jobs without
hesitating to calculate the likelihood of litigation.10 Also vital, however,
is that citizens must possess a mechanism to hold the powerful state
responsible for flagrant and glaring abuses that could become worse and
more prevalent if left completely unchecked.'1
The state-created danger doctrine must be standardized and
simplified in order to be more easily understood and more consistently
applied, especially in the context of police action.12  Part II of this
Comment will provide an overview of the state-created danger doctrine
and examine a contemporary case, Vaughn v. City of Chicago,13 as an
example of the issues involved in applying the state-created danger
doctrine to police action. Part III will examine how each federal circuit
has approached the state-created danger doctrine, highlighting how each
circuit has wrestled with the doctrine resulting in a lack of uniformity
across the circuits. Part IV will analyze the doctrine in the context of
police action, using Vaughn14 as a case study. Finally, Part V will
propose a simplified, flexible, federal test that seeks a balance between:
(1) protection from mistreatment and overzealousness, and (2)
successfully maintaining public safety.
7. See discussion infra Part III.
8. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
9. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
10. See Patrick Jonsson, How Police Can Get it Right, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR
(Feb. 8, 2015), www.csmonitor.com/ usa/society/2015/0208/how-police-can-get-it-right.
Concerns about second-guessing can have a direct impact on police action. The Atlanta
Police Chief, George Turner, cited an instance where an officer hesitated before shooting
a knife-wielding attacker because the officer was thinking about recent protests in
Ferguson, Missouri. Id. See infra note 212. "Where to strike the balance between using
potentially lethal force and holding back is something that beat cops and chiefs are
struggling with across the country in the wake of the most searing debate over police
tactics in a half century." Jonsson, supra.
11. See Bryan Caplan, The Totalitarian Threat, in GLOBAL CATASTROPHIC RISKS
504, 504 (Nick Bostrom et al. eds., 2008) (explaining that unchecked police control and
terror is a common and necessary characteristic of totalitarian regimes).
12. See infra Parts IV.B. and IV.C.
13. See generally Vaughn v. City of Chicago, No. 14-C-47, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
78951 (N.D. Ill. June 18, 2015).
14. Id.
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II. BACKGROUND
While each federal circuit has addressed the state-created danger
doctrine in some form, substantive differences exist in the elements that a
plaintiff must prove to assert the doctrine.15 The circuits resort to a
similar toolbox of terms but apply them in different combinations.
1 6
Common elements include: (1) behavior elements, such as affirmative
acts,17 visibly overt behavior,1 8 and deliberate indifference;19 (2)
qualitative elements, such as danger
20 and a shock to the conscience;
21
and (3) additional elements, such as a hyper-pressurized environment,
22
a special relationship,2 3  foreseeability,24  and a misuse of state
25authority.
Ironically, the possibility of liability for a state-created danger
emerged from a case that was instrumental in thoroughly limiting state
responsibility for private violence.6 Seizing on a few words buried deep
in the opinion, plaintiffs across the nation assert the viability of state-
27created danger as an exception to state immunity. DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Department of Social Services is the seminal case
regarding state-created anger theory, and this case planted the seed for
each circuit's interpretation of the doctrine.28
A. DeShaney and the State-Created Danger Doctrine
In 1989, the U.S. Supreme Court in DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Department of Social Services held that states generally have no
constitutional duty to protect citizens from private violence.29 The Court,
15. SCHWARTZ & KIRKLIN, supra note 6.
16. Id.
17. Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94, 99 (2d Cir. 1993); Freeman v.
Ferguson, 911 F.2d 52, 55 (8th Cir. 1990).
18. Dwares, 985 F.2d at 99-100.
19. Foy v. City of Berea, 58 F.3d 227, 232 (6th Cir. 1995).
20. Cartwright v. City of Marine City, 336 F.3d 487, 493 (6th Cir. 2003).
21. Forrester v. Bass, 397 F.3d 1047, 1058-59 (8th Cir. 2005).
22. Miller v. City of Philadelphia, 174 F.3d 368, 375 (3d Cir. 1999).
23. Pena v. DePrisco, 432 F.3d 98, 109 (2d Cir. 2005).
24. Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1153 (3d Cir. 1995).
25. Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 915 (3d Cir. 1997).
26. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 201 (1989).
27. See generally Vaughn v. City of Chicago, No. 14-C-47, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
107952 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 5, 2014), dismissed on summary judgment, Vaughn v. City of
Chicago, No. 14-C-47, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78951 (N.D. Ill. June 18, 2015).
28. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201.
29. Id. at 195 ("But nothing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself
requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion
by private actors.").
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however, conceded that certain individuals, like incarcerated prisoners
and involuntarily committed mental patients, are awarded a duty of
protection by the state through a special relationship when they are in
custody.3° In addition to imposing a duty to certain individuals in
custody, the DeShaney Court may have identified a possible second
exemption from the no-duty rule: the "state-created danger doctrine.31
This doctrine is more enigmatic, based on dicta offered by the Court
when explaining the main holding:
[w]hile the State may have been aware of the dangers that [the
victim] faced in the free world, [the State] played no part in their creation
[of the dangers], nor did it do anything to render [the victim] any more
vulnerable to harm.... [I]t placed [the victim] in no worse position than
that in which [the victim] would have been had it not acted at all ....
While seeming to offer the possibility of a duty of protection in
state-created anger situations, the DeShaney Court's dicta failed to offer
specific instances of state actors playing a part in the creation of a danger
or rendering a victim more vulnerable to harm.33 That vacuum has
allowed the circuits to develop their own state-created anger doctrines.
34
B. Vaughn and the Complications of Police Action
The state-created danger doctrine of DeShaney was applied to
police action in Vaughn v. City of Chicago.
35
Plaintiff Albert Vaughn, Sr. sued the City of Chicago and four of its
police officers on behalf of his deceased son, Albert Vaughn, Jr., who
had been ordered at gunpoint by Chicago City police to drop a stick the
son held during a street tiff.36 The son complied, but retrieved the stick
after a rival group member verbally threatened him.37 Officers ordered
the son to drop the stick again, and he again complied.38 An assailant
then came forward and beat the son to death with a baseball bat as the
police watched, allegedly doing nothing to protect Vaughn, Jr.39
The District Court, in denying a motion to dismiss filed by the City
and the police officers, applied the Seventh Circuit's three-element est
30. Id. at 198-99.
31. Id. at 201.
32. Id. at 201.
33. Id.
34. SCHWARTZ & KIRKLN, supra note 6.
35. Vaughn v. City of Chicago, No. 14-C-47, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78951, at *10
(N.D. Il1. June 18, 2015).
36. Vaughn, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107952, at *2.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 3.
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for a state-created danger: an affirmative act, proximate cause, and
shocking the conscience.4° After applying the test, plaintiffs action was
permitted to proceed.41 The public policy implications of applying the
state-created danger doctrine to police action like that in Vaughn will be
examined below,42 after a circuit-by-circuit analysis of the doctrine that
demonstrates a confusing lack of uniformity.
43
III. CONSTRUCTION BY THE CIRCUITS
A. The First Circuit
Although the First Circuit has not expressly rejected the state-
created danger doctrine, it has not yet applied the doctrine and appears
wary of doing so.44 After the DeShaney decision, the First Circuit began
distancing itself from the doctrine.45 Referencing the DeShaney Court's
dicta regarding state-created dangers used by other circuits to support
their state-created danger doctrines,46 the First Circuit decided that an
affirmative act by the state, even an act with deliberate indifference that
played a "causal role in the harm," should not rise to the level of a
constitutional violation but be deemed tortious in nature only.47 Four
years later, the Circuit again dismissed the "deliberate indifference"
standard as insufficient but hinted at adopting a "shocks the conscience"
standard for creation-of-danger cases in the future.48 Nonetheless, the
Circuit once again declined to apply the doctrine.49
In recent years the First Circuit has solidified its earlier position,
acknowledging that it has examined the state-created danger doctrine but
40. Id. at *4 (explaining that the state-created danger doctrine has three elements
centered around an affirmative act, proxinfiate cause, and shocking the conscience).
41. Id.
42. See discussion infra Part 1.C.
43. See discussion infra Part III.
44. See generally Monahan v. Dorchester Counseling Ctr., Inc., 961 F.2d 987 (1st
Cir. 1992); Evans v. Avery, 100 F.3d 1033 (1st Cir. 1996); Rivera v. Rhode Island, 402
F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2005). See also Milenaa Shtelmakher, Police Misconduct and Liability:
Applying the State-Created Danger Doctrine to Hold Police Officers Accountable for
Responding Inadequately to Domestic- Violence Situations, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1533,
1540 (2010).
45. Monahan, 961 F.2d at 987.
46. Id. (quoting DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201) (stating that "while the state may have
been aware of the dangers that [plaintiff] faced in the free world, it played no part in their
creation nor did it do anything to render him more vulnerable to them").
47. Id. at 993.
48. Evans, 100 F.3d at 1037-38.
49. See id. at 1038 (explaining that "having clarified the applicable legal standard,
we need not tarry. The evidence of record here ... does not satisfy the 'shock the
conscience' test").
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has never found the doctrine actionable.50  The Circuit left open the
option of applying the doctrine, referencing the extreme example of
police handing a murderer a gun and telling the murderer to shoot the
victim.51 Despite this, the First Circuit maintained that mere allegations
of "state actions which render the individual more vulnerable to harm,
under a theory of state created danger, cannot be used as an end run
around DeShaney's core holding"52 of non-liability.
B. The Second Circuit
In contrast to the First Circuit's wariness, the Second Circuit was
one of the first circuits to embrace the state-created danger doctrine.53
The Second Circuit concentrated on affirmative actions by state actors
that create or increase the risk of a danger to the victim. 54 The Second
Circuit does not define "affirmative action" but seems to require more
than visibly overt behavior.55
By 2009, the Second Circuit had acknowledged a spectrum of
affirmative conduct that included both implicit and explicit conduct.
56
The Second Circuit held that even government officials' inaction may
rise to the affirmative conduct level if continuous and persistent, "even if
there is no explicit approval or encouragement."57  Interpreting
DeShaney, the Second Circuit rejected the "special relationship"
50. Rivera v. Rhode Island, 402 F.3d 27, 35 (1st Cir. 2005).
51. Id. at 34 (referencing Hemphill v. Schott, 141 F.3d 412, 418-19 (2d Cir.
1998)).
52. Id. at 38.
53. Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94, 99 (2d Cir. 1993) (referencing the
Eighth Circuit and its decision in Freeman v. Ferguson, 911 F.2d 52 (8th Cir. 1990)).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 99-100 (finding the complaint adequately alleged that police officers
"conspired with the 'skinheads' to permit the latter to beat up flag burners with relative
impunity, assuring the 'skinheads' that unless they got totally out of control they should
not be impeded or arrested"). See generally Ying Jing Gan v. City of New York, 996
F.2d 522 (2d Cir. 1993). But see Pitchell v. Callan, 13 F.3d 545, 549 (2d Cir. 1994)
(finding no assumption of automatic duty status at direct verbal threat to life).
56. See Okin v. Vill. of Cornwall-On-Hudson Police Dep't, 577 F.3d 415, 434-35
(2d Cir. 2009) (holding that "affirmative police conduct runs along the spectrum of
explicit and implicit actions" and "the state-created danger theory ... prohibit[s]...
affirmatively contributing to the vulnerability of a known victim by engaging in conduct,
whether explicit or implicit, that encourages intentional violence against the victim...");
see also Hemphill v. Schott, 141 F.3d 412, 418 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding handing over a
gun without saying anything implicitly communicated the use of the gun would be
officially sanctioned by police).
57. Okin, 577 F.3d at 428 (citing Dwares, 985 F.2d at 99 and Pena v. DePrisco, 432
F.3d 98, 111 (2d Cir. 2005)).
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condition as a requirement for liability, treating state-created dangers and
special relationships as separate liability theories.5 8
C. The Third Circuit
By 1995, the Third Circuit had not yet decided whether it would
recognize the state-created danger theory and continued its practice of
calling such claims "plaintiffs theories.' 59 However, the Third Circuit
began extensive "observation" of other circuit cases and standards,
60remarking in detail about particular commonalities. Merely a year
later, the Third Circuit recognized the doctrine and categorized the
language observed in other circuit cases into formal legal elements.61
The formal elements the Third Circuit identified were: (1) foreseeability;
(2) shocking the conscience; (3) relationships; and (4) the affirmative use
of authority.62 These elements would become more refined and detailed
63as the Third Circuit attempted to further define them.
In particular, the third and fourth elements, relationships and use of
authority, have been repeatedly reexamined, rephrased, and rewritten.64
Conversely, the first two elements, foreseeability and shocking the
58. Pena, 432 F.3d at 109 (citing Ying Jing Gan v. City of N.Y., 996 F.2d 522, 533
(2d Cir. 1993)).
59. Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1152 (3d Cir. 1995) (stating that
"[flor our part, we have yet to decide definitively whether the state-created danger theory
is a viable mechanism for finding a constitutional injury ... we have found language in
the cases supporting and opposing the existence of a state-created danger theory. Perhaps
at some point we will have to harmonize our cases. But we have not reached that
day..."). See generally D.R. by L.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Tech. Sch., 972
F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992); Brown v. Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097 (3d Cir. 1990).
60. Mark, 51 F.3d at 1153 (remarking that "cases like these have four things in
common ...." and noting that "the cases where the state-created danger theory was
applied were based on discrete, grossly reckless acts committed by the state ... leaving a
discrete plaintiff vulnerable to foreseeable injury").
61. Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1208-11 (3d Cir. 1996).
62. Id.
63. See Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 908 (3d Cir. 1997);
Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 430 F.3d 140, 153 (3d Cir. 2005); Schieber v. City of
Philadelphia, 320 F.3d 409, 417 (3d Cir. 2003); Kaucher v. Cry. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418,
431 (3d Cir. 2006). Compare Morse, 132 F.3d at 908 (listing "(3) there existed some
relationship between the state and the plaintiff; (4) the state actors used their authority to
create an opportunity that otherwise would not have existed for the third party's crime to
occur"), with Kaucher, 455 F.3d at 431 (listing "(3) a relationship between the state and
the plaintiff existed such that the plaintiff was a foreseeable victim of the defendant's
acts, or a member of a discrete class of persons subjected to the potential harm brought
about by the state actions, as opposed to a member of the public in general; and (4) a state
actor affirmatively used his or her authority in a way that created a danger to the citizen
or that rendered the citizen more vulnerable to danger than had the state not acted at all").
64. See Morse, 132 F.3d at 908; Schieber, 320 F.3d at 418.
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conscience, have largely remained intact.65 The Third Circuit is clear
that threats to the general population alone do not trigger applying the
66doctrine. Yet the Third Circuit struggled with whether a class of
plaintiffs or a specific person was required to meet the special
relationship element, ultimately referring back to the foreseeability
element.
67
As to the fourth element, affirmative use of authority, the Third
Circuit has wrestled with precisely defining affirmative conduct.68 The
Circuit originally treated foreseeability as important in determining
whether an omission can be characterized as an affirmative act.69 More
recently, it required a "misuse of state authority, rather than a failure [to
act]" along with establishing direct causation as more important than
foreseeability.
70
The Third Circuit has a unique angle to its state-created danger
71doctrine. It recognizes a concept of a "hyperpressurized environment"
for situations such as high-speed chases or prison riots. 72  In these
situations, liability attaches only when a plaintiff shows that the harm
was intentionally caused.73 Unlike circuits that reject the doctrine or call
it an exception, the Third Circuit has labeled the state-created danger
doctrine "a complement to the DeShaney holding. 74
D. The Fourth Circuit
In the Fourth Circuit, however, DeShaney requires that a plaintiff be
in actual state custody, such as institutionalization or incarceration,
before he or she can assert any due process claim involving an
affirmative duty of the state.75 Such a requirement decisively curbs any
65. See Morse, 132 F.3d at 908; Schieber, 320 F.3d at 418.
66. Morse, 132 F.3d at 913-14.
67. Id. at 914.
68. Id. at 915-16.
69. Id.
70. Compare id. at 915 (explaining "[t]hus, the dispositive factor appears to be
whether the state has in some way placed the plaintiff in a dangerous position that was
foreseeable, and not whether the act was more appropriately characterized as an
affirmative act or an omission"), and Smith, 318 F.3d at 507, with Kaucher, 445 F.3d at
432-33 (emphasizing use over failure to use).
71. Smith, 430 F.3d at 153.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Burella v. City of Philadelphia, 501 F.3d 134, 146 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Bright
v. Westmoreland Cty., 443 F.3d 276, 281 (3d Cir. 2006)).
75. Piechowicz v. United States, 885 F.2d 1207, 1215 (4th Cir. 1989); Rowland v.
Perry, 41 F.3d 167, 174-75 (4th Cir. 1994); Pinder v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1169, 1175 (4th
Cir. 1995); Waybright v. Frederick Cty., 528 F.3d 199, 207 (4th Cir. 2008).
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operative state-created danger theory. It instead imposes a special
relationship prerequisite.
76
The Fourth Circuit opined that a right to affirmative protection
would be poor public policy. 77  Finding such a right could result in
potentially endless liability each time the state did anything that may be
interpreted as affirmatively making a danger or injury more likely.78 The
Fourth Circuit declared that "[it] makes sense" to look at DeShaney as a
"bright-line decision, in which the Court saw in the admittedly
sympathetic case the first step o[f] a long, litigious journey.' 79 As a
result, the Fourth Circuit has actively avoided applying the state-created
danger doctrine by continually differentiating the facts of each case.
80
Therefore, whether the Circuit actually recognizes the state-created
danger doctrine is unclear.
81
E. The Fifth Circuit
In the early 1990s, the Fifth Circuit seemed to be a potential
enthusiastic supporter of the state-created danger doctrine, stating
explicitly that a victim need not be in state custody for the doctrine to
apply.82 As time went by, however, the Fifth Circuit became less keen
about the doctrine.83 The Fifth Circuit noted that it had not yet officially
adopted the doctrine, while calling an appellant's effort at arguing the
theory a "semantic dodge" and an "attempt to escape DeShaney's
holding."84
For years, the Fifth Circuit vacillated on whether to adopt the
85 8doctrine. Finally, in 2004, the Circuit all but rejected the doctrine.86
76. Id.
77. Pinder, 54 F.3d at 1176.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1178.
80. Id.
81. See id. at 1177 (explaining that "these cases involve a wholly different
paradigm than that presented here... these cases stand for the proposition that state
actors may not disclaim liability when they themselves throw others to the lions"); see
also Waybright, 528 F.3d at 208 (explaining that "[tjhe practical consequences would be
immense; by finding a state-created danger here we might well inject federal authority
into public school...").
82. Johnson v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 38 F.3d 198, 200 (5th Cir. 1994).
83. See generally Saenz v. Heldenfels Bros., Inc., 183 F.3d 389 (5th Cir. 1999);
McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314 (5th Cir. 2002); Beltran v. City of El
Paso, 367 F.3d 299 (5th Cir. 2004).
84. Saenz, 183 F.3d at 392.
85. MeClendon, 305 F.3d at 325 (citing Walton v. Alexander, 44 F.3d 1297, 1299
(5th Cir. 1995); Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 584 (5th Cir. 2001);
Randolph v. Cervantes, 130 F.3d 727, 731 (5th Cir. 1997)). See also Scanlan v. Texas A
& M Univ., 343 F.3d 533 (5th Cir. 2003).
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The Fifth Circuit noted that it "consistently refused to recognize a 'state-
created danger' theory" and that it would not do so then.
7
F. The Sixth Circuit
The Sixth Circuit requires a plaintiff to prove a "special danger"
when asserting the state-created danger exception.88 A special danger
occurs when a state actor puts an individual victim, as compared to the
general public, at risk through some affirmative conduct.89 From the
beginning, the Circuit focused on the issue of vulnerability, requiring that
the state conduct directly increase the individual's vulnerability to danger
through deliberate indifference.90
The Sixth Circuit uses the U.S. Supreme Court's definition for
deliberate indifference in its standard.91 Thus, deliberate indifference is
"more than mere negligence" but "something less than acts or omissions
for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will
result.,92  In recent decisions, the Circuit has also equated deliberate
indifference with subjective recklessness.
93
There is, however, a lack of consistency within the Sixth Circuit
itself. At least one case breaks the Sixth Circuit's standard into three
separate elements.94 The Circuit has also recently suggested that some
type of interaction between the state and the victim is required before its
86. Beltran, 367 F.3d at 307.
87. Id.
88. Cartwright v. City of Marine City, 336 F.3d 487, 493 (6th Cir. 2003); Jones v.
Union Cty., Tenn., 296 F.3d 417, 430 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Kallstrom v. City of
Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055, 1066 (6th Cir. 1998)).
89. Jones, 296 F.3d at 428-30; Kallstrom, 136 F.3d at 1066-67.
90. See Gazette v. City of Pontiac, 41 F.3d 1061, 1065 (6th Cir. 1994); Davis v.
Brady, 143 F.3d 1021, 1025-26 (6th Cir. 1998); Bukowski v. City of Akron, 326 F.3d
702, 708-09 (6th Cir. 2003).
91. Foy v. City of Berea, 58 F.3d 227, 232 (6th Cir. 1995) (quoting Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1970)).
92. Id.
93. See McQueen v. Beecher Cmty. Sch., 433 F.3d 460, 469 (6th Cir. 2006)
(explaining subjective recklessness as being both aware of facts from which an inference
could be drawn and actually drawing that inference).
94. Cartwright v. City of Marine City, 336 F.3d 487, 493 (citing Kallstrom v. City
of Columbus 136 F.3d 1055, 1066 (6th Cir. 1998). The three elements outlined by the
court include: "(1) an affirmative act by the state which either created or increased the
risk that the plaintiff would be exposed to an act of violence by a third party; (2) a special
danger to the plaintiff wherein the state's actions placed the plaintiff specifically at risk,
as distinguished from a risk that affects the public at large; and (3) the state knew or
should have known that its actions specifically endangered the plaintiff").
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standard can be met.95 Depending on how "interaction" is interpreted,
this prerequisite could rigorously limit state-created danger claims in the
Sixth Circuit going forward.
G. The Seventh Circuit
After DeShaney, the Seventh Circuit approached the state-created
danger doctrine with caution.96 Still, its early decisions acknowledge the
viability of such a doctrine.97 While initially hesitant to find liability in
noncustodial situations, in 1993 the Seventh Circuit expressed approval
of looking to "reasonable action based on the specific circumstances" of
an incident.
98
To this day, the idea of sensibleness and simplicity is prominent in
the Seventh Circuit's characterization of its state-created danger
doctrine.99  The Seventh Circuit contends that it applies a "simple
formula" as compared to "the tendency of some courts to 'complexify'
[the] analysis in this class of cases needlessly ... ,100 The Seventh
Circuit has criticized phrases such as "shocks the conscience" and
"affirmative acts" as unhelpful and confusing.'O°
Despite its criticisms, however, the Seventh Circuit still uses these
same terms in its own doctrine. The Circuit continues to apply this
elements test:
(1) the state by its affirmative acts must create or increase a danger
faced by an individual; (2) the failure on the part of the state to protect an
individual from such a danger must be the proximate cause of the injury
to the individual; and (3) the state's failure to protect the individual must
shock the conscience.1
0 2
95. See Jones v. Reynolds, 438 F.3d 685, 693-94 (6th Cir. 2006) (noting that police"never had any interaction with [the plaintiff]," and in fact "the officers never met [the
plaintiff]").
96. See Ross v. United States, 910 F.2d 1422, 1428 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that"we need do no more than cite the line of precedent from the Supreme Court and this
court, holding that the government's failure to provide essential services does not violate
the Constitution. See DeShaney .. "); Losinski v. Cty. of Trempealeau, 946 F.2d 544,
551 (7th Cir. 1991) (claiming "DeShaney compels our conclusion... ").
97. See Losinski, 946 F.2d at 550 (permitting "DeShaney provides some support for
[the plaintiff's] view by basing the 'special relationship' exception in part on the state's
role in increasing a citizen's risk of harm").
98. Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122, 1126-27 (7th Cir. 1993).
99. See Slade v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of Milwaukee, 702 F.3d 1027, 1033 (7th Cir.
2012).
100. Id. at 1033.
101. Id.
102. King ex rel. King v. East St. Louis Sch. Dist., 496 F.3d 812, 817-18 (7th Cir.
2007).
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The Circuit treats an affirmative act as something other than state
inaction.10 3 Creating or substantially contributing to the creation of a
danger or rendering a victim more vulnerable to a danger than he or she
otherwise would have been may create state liability.' °4 The Seventh
Circuit does not require all avenues of self-help or aid to be cut off by
state actors for liability to attach.10 5 No requirement exists for a special
relationship and state-created danger liability is not characterized as an
exception to DeShaney. 06
H. The Eighth Circuit
Acknowledging the state-created danger doctrine in the early 1990s,
the Eighth Circuit took the next step when it plainly stated that the
doctrine may apply in non-custodial settings.107 The Eighth Circuit's
standard requires affirmative action by the state that increased an
individual's danger of, or his vulnerability to, the violence he faced
beyond what it would have been without the state action.108 The Eighth
Circuit emphasized the requirement of placing a specific victim in a
dangerous position that the victim would not have otherwise encountered
without the affirmative state action.1
°9
While quickly setting up its itemized tests and components for the
doctrine and holding that DeShaney clearly creates a constitutional duty
to protect, the Eighth Circuit was careful to acknowledge that DeShaney
was far from clear.110 The Circuit has since found that the wrongdoer's
state of mind is relevant in determining whether the state is liable.
11' It
has also embraced the following elements in its doctrine:
(1) [The] plaintiffs are members of a limited, precisely definable
group; (2) the state's conduct put victims at significant risk of serious,
immediate, and proximate harm; (3) the risk was obvious or known to
103. Stevens v. Umsted, 131 F.3d 697, 705 (7th Cir. 1997); Hernandez v. City of
Goshen, 324 F.3d 535, 538 (7th Cir. 2003).
104. Dykema v. Skoumal, 261 F.3d 701, 705 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing Reed v.
Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122, 1126 (7th Cir. 1993)).
105. Monfils v. Taylor, 165 F.3d 511, 517 (7th Cir. 1998).
106. Paine v. Cason, 678 F.3d 500, 510 (7th Cir. 2012).
107. Freeman v. Ferguson, 911 F.2d 52, 55 (8th Cir. 1990).
108. Id.
109. See Wells v. Walker, 852 F.2d 368, 370 (8th Cir. 1988); Freeman, 911 F.2d at
55; Gregory v. City of Rogers, 974 F.2d 1006, 1010 (8th Cir. 1992).
110. Freeman, 911 F.2d at 55 (stating that "[i]t is not clear, under DeShaney, how
large a role the state must play in the creation of danger and in the creation of
vulnerability before it assumes a corresponding constitutional duty to protect. It is clear,
though, that at some point such actions do create such a duty").
111. Hart v. City of Little Rock, 432 F.3d 801, 805 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing S.S. v.
McMullen, 225 F.3d 960, 962 (8th Cir. 2000)).
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the state; (4) the state acted recklessly in conscious disregard of the risk;
and (5) in total, the state's conduct shocks the conscience. 1
12
Of the five foregoing elements, the "conscience-shocking" element
is particularly important as it is explained in great detail through the case
law.113 To prove this element, a plaintiff must prove that the state actor's
action was "so egregious [and] so outrageous[] that it ... shock[ed] the
contemporary conscience.
' ' 14
I. The Ninth Circuit
In the Ninth Circuit, the state-created danger doctrine may apply
when the government affirmatively places a victim in danger and the
victim is more vulnerable due to the government's act."' State liability
for an action that exacerbated or created a danger had been
comprehensively addressed pre-DeShaney, and these older examinations
continue to play a role in the development of the Circuit's state-created
danger doctrine." 6 When the state itself puts someone in danger, an
obligation to protect may result, even in non-custodial settings. 117
While the Ninth Circuit uses the familiar "affirmative conduct" and
"deliberate indifference" elements, it does not require the state's conduct
to shock the conscience.118 To allege liability based on the state-created
danger theory, the Circuit requires the state: (1) acted affirmatively; (2)
with deliberate indifference; (3) in creating a foreseeable injury to the
plaintiff.119 What constitutes an inherent danger has sometimes been
labeled as common sense.
120
112. Hart, 432 F.3d at 805 (citing Avalos v. City of Glenwood, 382 F.3d 792, 798
(8th Cir. 2004) (citing Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567, 574 (10th Cir. 1995))).
113. See Forrester v. Bass, 397 F.3d 1047, 1058 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing Burton v.
Richmond, 370 F.3d 723, 727 (8th Cir. 2004)).
114. Hart, 432 F.3d at 805 (citing Hawkins v. Holloway, 316 F.3d 777, 780 (8th
Cir. 2003)).
115. Wang v. Reno, 81 F.3d 808, 819 (9th Cir. 1996); Munger v. City of Glasgow
Police Dep't, 227 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2000).
116. See Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 594 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Escamilla v.
City of Santa Ana, 796 F.2d 266, 269 (9th Cir. 1986)).
117. Escamilla v. City of Santa Ana, 796 F.2d 266, 269 (9th Cir. 1986); L.W. v.
Grubbs, 974 F.2d 119, 121 (9th Cir. 1992).
118. Penilla v. City of Huntington Park, 115 F.3d 707, 710 (9th Cir. 1997);
Kennedy v. City of Ridgefield, 439 F.3d 1055, 1064-65 (9th Cir. 2006).
119. Lawrence v. United States, 340 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Huffman
v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 147 F.3d 1054, 1061 (9th Cir. 1998) and Van Ort v. Estate of
Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831, 836-37 (9th Cir. 1996)).
120. Lewis v. Sacramento Cty., 98 F.3d 434, 441 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Wood, 879
F.2d at 590)).
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J. The Tenth Circuit
The Tenth Circuit characterizes two exceptions to the general rule
that the DeShaney Court established-the special relationship doctrine
and the danger creation theory.12 For danger creation liability to apply,
an actual intent to harm or expose the victim to risk without regard to the
consequences is required.22  The Tenth Circuit uses a six-part test to
determine if actual intent to harm existed:
(1) the charged state entity and the charged individual actors created
the danger or increased plaintiff's vulnerability to the danger in some
way; (2) [the] plaintiff was a member of a limited and specifically
definable group; (3) defendants' conduct put plaintiff at substantial risk
of serious, immediate, and proximate harm; (4) the risk was obvious or
known; (5) defendants acted recklessly in conscious disregard of that
risk; and (6) such conduct, when viewed in total, is conscience
shocking.
123
The Tenth Circuit has purposefully kept the standard for shocking
the conscience vague, choosing not to define what "shocks the
conscience."124 The Tenth Circuit has only stated that § 1983 claims
should not replace state tort law and that a "need for restraint" exists in
defming the scope of substantive due process claims.1
25 Changing the
status quo is another referenced idea. 26  The Tenth Circuit often
contrasts facts where the status quo has changed with the facts from
DeShaney, finding DeShaney's main holding of no-duty inapplicable in
such situations.127 Interestingly, this Circuit has also distinctively found
that the U.S. Supreme Court did not decide whether a state could warrant
its citizens protective services as an entitlement property right, as
"DeShaney limited its constitutional review to whether a substantive due
process right to government protection exists in the abstract. ,128
121. Christiansen v. City of Tulsa, 332 F.3d 1270, 1279-80 (10th Cir. 2003) (citing
Armijo v. Wagon Mound Pub. Sch., 159 F.3d 1253, 1260 (10th Cir. 1998)(quoting
Liebson v. N.M. Corr. Dep't, 73 F.3d 274, 276 (10th Cir. 1996))).
122. Christiansen, 322 F.3d at 1281.
123. Armio, 159 F.3d at 1263; Currier v. Doran, 242 F.3d 905, 918 (10th Cir.
2001); Christiansen, 322 F.3d at 1281 (citing Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, 307 F.3d
1258, 1263 (10th Cir. 2002)). See also Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567, 572 (10th Cir.
1995).
124. Armijo, 159 F.3d at 1263 (quoting Uhlrig, 64 F.3d at 572).
125. Id.
126. Currier, 242 F.3d at 923 (citing Medina v. City & Cty. of Denver, 960 F.2d
1493, 1497 (10th Cir. 1992)).
127. See id. at 919 (explaining that "when the state affirmatively acts to remove a
child from the custody of one parent and then places the child with another parent,
DeShaney does not foreclose constitutional liability").
128. Gonzales, 366 F.3d at 1099.
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K. The Eleventh Circuit
The Eleventh Circuit uses both a subjective test and an objective
test in evaluating state-created danger claims.1 29  For the subjective
assessment, a plaintiff must show that a state actor had subjective
knowledge of a risk of serious harm, yet disregarded it with "deliberate
indifference."'' 30 Deliberate indifference is defined as ignoring a strong
likelihood, as opposed to a mere possibility, that harm could occur.131
The objective assessment asks whether a reasonable official would
recognize that he or she was "violating the Constitution even without
case law on point."
' 132
L. The D.C. Circuit
The D.C. Circuit was the last circuit to address the state-created
danger doctrine.'33 In 2001, the Circuit took the opportunity to address
the state-created danger doctrine in Butera v. District of Columbia.134 In
Butera, the D.C. Circuit examined other circuits' tests and reasonings.13 5
In its analysis, the D.C. Circuit concluded that a "lack of clarity [exists]
in the law of the circuits" and that while the various tests focus on
affirmative conduct, "they are inconsistent in their elaborations of the
concept.' 36 Accordingly, the D.C. Circuit declined to apply the state-
created danger doctrine.137 Nationwide, questions remain as to its proper
reach.
129. See Gish v. Thomas, 516 F.3d 952, 954 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Snow ex. rel.
Snow v. City of Citronelle, 420 F.3d 1262, 1268 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Cook ex rel.
Estate of Tessier v. Sheriff of Monroe Cty., 402 F.3d 1092, 1115 (11th Cir. 2005)));
Lewis v. City of West Palm Beach, 561 F.3d 1288, 1292 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Priester
v. City of Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d 919, 926-27 (1 1th Cir. 2000)).
130. Gish, 516 F.3d at 954 (quoting Cook, 402 F.3d at 1115) (quoting Cagle v.
Sutherland, 334 F.3d 980, 986 (1 1th Cir. 2003))).
131. Id.
132. See Lewis, 561 F.3d at 1292 (quoting Smith v. Mattox, 127 F.3d 1416, 1419
(11 th Cir. 1997)) (explaining that "to come within this narrow exclusion, a 'plaintiff must
show that the official's conduct was so far beyond the hazy border between excessive and
acceptable force that the official had to know he was violating the Constitution even
without case law on point"').
133. Butera v. District of Columbia, 235 F.3d 637, 648 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 650 ("Regardless of the conduct at issue, however, the circuits have held
that a key requirement for constitutional liability is affirmative conduct by the State to
increase or create the danger that results in harm to the individual.").
136. Id. at 654.
137. Id. at 662.
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IV. ANALYSIS
The foregoing discussion demonstrates the lack of a uniform state-
created danger test. That lacking uniformity offers conflicting guidance
for state actors and the public. The absence of consistency potentially
allows for behavior in one circuit to be actionable while being acceptable
in another circuit. Thus, a uniform standard for the state-created danger
doctrine is desirable. To achieve proper harmony, the state-created
danger doctrine must also balance public policy considerations. The
Vaughn facts provide a case study in police action that highlights the
importance of meshing a court-created test with critical policy
considerations.
A. Vaughn v. City of Chicago
On August 5, 2014, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois denied a motion to dismiss filed by the City of Chicago and
four of its police officers, finding a sufficiently alleged state-created
danger claim.138 Plaintiff and defendants described two very different
sets of circumstances in Vaughn.1 39  It is useful to consider how
dramatically the two recitations of facts differed. That difference
demonstrates that any state-created danger test must be adaptable to
various factual situations.
1. The Scene of the Alleged Conduct
On April 5, 2008 at approximately 11:00 p.m., Albert Vaughn, Jr.
was in the vicinity of 7033 S. Throop in Chicago, Illinois. 1" An
altercation between a group of young people was taking place in the
138. Vaughn v. City of Chicago, No. 14-C-47, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107952, at
*1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 5, 2014). The Vaughn court curiously "took no position" on plaintiff's
side argument that Vaughn Jr. had a clearly established Second Amendment right to have
a stick for self-defense during an altercation in a public street. Such a Second
Amendment claim raises other important issues. See Bob Adelmann, Chicago's Gun
Laws Prevent Poor From Defending Themselves, NEW AMERICAN (Sept. 30, 2014),
http://www. thenewamerican.com/usnews/crime/item/19219-chicago-s-gun-laws-
prevent-poor-from-defending-themselves/.
139. Compare infra Part IV.A.3, with Part IV.A.2. The factual recitation here relies
on the conflicting accounts by the plaintiffs and defendants in their competing motion to
dismiss filings. The purpose is to highlight the difficulty in applying current state-created
danger tests to competing interpretations of a similar factual situation. The court
subsequently rendered a summary judgment opinion in Vaughn v. City of Chicago, No.
14-C-47, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78951 (N.D. Il. June 18, 2015), which is examined in
Part V.B. below.
140. Third Amended Complaint at 11, Vaughn, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107952
(Jan. 3, 2014) (No. 14-C-47).
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street.141  Due to the altercation, several Chicago police officers,
including the defendants, were dispatched to the scene.142 At some point
during the altercation, an assailant beat Albert Vaughn, Jr. to death with
a baseball bat. 143
2. The Defendants' Facts
Defendant officers alleged they were responding to a battery in
progress, and when they arrived on the scene, dozens of individuals were
fighting each other in the street.144 Finding someone bleeding and lying
in the street and realizing they needed more help dealing with the chaos,
the two original officers radioed for backup and called for an
ambulance.1 45 Four more officers responded to a call for assistance with
a riot or mob in progress. 46
Decedent Vaughn, Jr., younger brother Alvin, and a friend, having
previously departed, returned to the scene where the police and the
crowd had gathered.147 The three males held sticks with nails attached to
the ends to protect themselves following an earlier fight.148 When they
approached the officers, one officer drew his weapon and directed them
to drop the sticks, which they all did.149 For the next 10 to 15 minutes,
the Vaughn group exchanged verbal arguments with others across the
street as more than ten police officers stood between the two factions.
1 50
An officer witnessed Vaughn, Jr.'s eventual assailant exit from a house
on the corner. 151 Later, that assailant silently ran up to Vaughn, Jr. from
behind an ambulance and hit him on the head twice with a baseball
bat. 1 52 At that time, defendant officers were within 20 to 50 feet of the
unexpected incident, which transpired in a matter of seconds.1 53 The
141. Id. at 12.
142. Id. at 13.
143. Vaughn, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107952, at *3.
144. Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of their Joint Motion for
Summary Judgment at 2-3, Vaughn, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107952 (Dec. 31, 2014) (No.
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officers immediately began chasing the assailant and apprehended
him. 1
54
The defendant officers argued that they did not create the danger
Vaughn, Jr. faced because he was already involved with the street
altercation before police arrived and that he returned to the altercation
voluntarily.155  The defendants noted that the officers did not bring
Vaughn, Jr. to the altercation, but Vaughn, Jr. was already present when
the officers arrived.156 The officers claimed that because Vaughn, Jr. was
"already in great danger" when they reached the scene, their actions did
not increase the danger to Vaughn, Jr. enough for them to be held liable
under the state-created danger doctrine.157 Defendants also asserted that
even if they did increase the danger to Vaughn, Jr., he had alternative
options, such as running away, and was not rendered completely
helpless.158 The defendant officers maintained that the attack on Vaughn,
Jr. was due to private violence' 59 As such, the officers should not be
held responsible.16° Moreover, the officers' conduct did not shock the
conscience and amounted to mere negligence at most.161
3. The Plaintiffs Facts
Contrastingly, plaintiff Vaughn, Sr. alleged that no altercation was
in progress when officers arrived and that no riot-like atmosphere existed
when the police officers ordered his son, Vaughn, Jr., to drop his stick.
162
There was, however, continued tension and Vaughn, Jr. wished to protect
himself.63  One policeman at the scene drew his gun and pointed it
directly at plaintiffs son.'64 Vaughn, Jr. immediately complied with the
officers' orders to drop the stick he held as protection for himself and his
younger brother.165 When a man whom Vaughn, Jr. did not know began
154. Defs.' Mem. Of Law in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J., supra note 144, at 4. The
assailant eventually pled guilty to first-degree murder of Vaughn, Jr. Id at 4-5
155. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 7, Vaughn, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107952
(May 14, 2014) (No. 14-C-47).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 9.
159. Id.
160. Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Third
Amended Complaint at 9, Vaughn, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107952 (July 10, 2014) (No.
14-C-47).




165. Third Amended Complaint, supra note 140, at 3.
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yelling obscenities directly at him, Vaughn, Jr. retrieved the stick.166 He
immediately dropped it again when police ordered him to do so.167
Plaintiff father further alleged that the unknown obscenity-yelling man
then began to approach his son, as officers stood within a few feet.
168
According to plaintiff Vaughn, Sr., each officer observed the man
carrying a metallic bat, but none of the officers told the man to drop the
bat.169
All of the officers stood and watched, without intervening, as
Vaughn, Jr. was hit in the head twice, rendering him motionless on the
pavement. 17 Vaughn, Sr. alleged the officers observed the assailant run
away from the scene.17 1 Vaughn, Jr. was taken to the hospital where he
was pronounced dead.172 Plaintiff Vaughn, Sr. asserted that defendant
officers were being sued for greatly increasing the danger Vaughn, Jr.
faced.173 Vaughn, Jr. had no injuries prior to the officers' actions, which
actions Vaughn, Sr. claimed had rendered his son helpless in the hostile
environment in which he was killed.
174
B. Difficulty of Applying Current Standards for the State-Created
Danger Doctrine
Applying the various state-created anger doctrines promulgated by
the circuit courts to any particular fact situation is challenging. Facts like
those in Vaughn provide a valuable case study of this difficulty. The
general difficulties and the Vaughn-specific issues are both reviewed
below.
1. General Difficulties
There are several fundamental complications with applying the state
created danger doctrine to any set of facts. First, as noted above,
reconciling initial perceptions of all sides and settling on the facts and
circumstances can be difficult. 175 Second, not all circuits recognize the
166. Id.
167. Id.





173. Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Third
Amended Complaint, supra note 160, at 4.
174. Id.
175. See Malcolm Gladwell, Seven Seconds in the Bronx: The Delicate Art of Mind
Reading, in BLINK: THE POWER OF THINKING WITHOUT THINKING 189, 189 (2005).
Gladwell describes a situation where police mistook an innocent man, essentially star-
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state-created danger doctrine.76  Third, of those that do recognize the
doctrine, no two circuits apply the same test to determine state
liability.177 The complications do not end here.
Language within circuits often seems puzzling and paradoxical. For
example, the Seventh Circuit's test uses terms that some courts in the
Circuit have called unhelpful, while continuing to use a test centered on
these very same terms.178 The Third Circuit has its own elements test,
but in defining the individual elements, the Circuit circles back to the
first element, without explaining why.179 The Tenth Circuit constructed a
six-element test but chose not to define one of the 'elements.80  The
Tenth Circuit instead discussed restraint in applying the doctrine
entirely.'81 Circuits that have never applied the doctrine and that are
blatantly skeptical or even hostile towards it stop short of actually
rejecting the doctrine. 82  Circuits that claim to recognize the doctrine
often find ways to avoid applying it.' 83 Perhaps the Eighth Circuit came
gazing on his porch in a poor neighborhood, for an at-large criminal. Id at 190. The
police shot and killed the man after observing him reach for something black in his
pocket. Id. at 192. The policemen said during their trial that they thought it was a gun.
Id. It was in fact the man's wallet. Id. The man, on the other hand, mistakenly thought
he was going to be robbed by the plain-clothed police officers, who had been driving an
unmarked car. Id. at 196. The victim's voluntary acquiescence in "the robbery" was
misinterpreted as hostile gunplay. Id. Gladwell highlights how split-second decision-
making is difficult when it is impossible to accurately process every fact and how we
often base our decisions on body language and implicit assumptions. Id. at 197.
176. See generally Veronica Zhang, Comment, Throwing the Defendant Into the
Snake Pit: Applying a State-created Danger Analysis to Prosecutorial Fabrication of
Evidence, 91 B.U. L. REV. 2150 (2011).
177. Id.
178. See King ex rel. King v. East St. Louis Sch. Dist. 496 F.3d 812 (7th Cir. 2007)
(applying the elements); Vaughn v. City of Chicago, No. 14-C-47, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 107952, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 5, 2014) (criticizing the elements' terms as
unhelpful before applying the elements).
179. See Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 914 (3d Cir. 1997)
(referring to foreseeability, the first element, when explaining relationship, the second
element).
180. Armijo v. Wagon Mound Pub. Sch., 159 F.3d 1253, 1263 (10th Cir. 1998)
(quoting Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567, 572 (10th Cir. 1995)) (choosing not to define
what shocks the conscience).
181. Id.
182. See generally Rivera v. Rhode Island, 402 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2005); Pinder v.
Johnson, 54 F.3d 1169 (4th Cir. 1995); Beltran v. City of El Paso, 367 F.3d 299 (5th Cir.
2004).
183. Often conduct is found in a conclusory manner not to have arisen to deliberate
indifference or a similar standard but was one of mere negligence. Frequently an act is
not found to be affirmative or it did not sufficiently shock the conscience. See Erwin
Chemerinsky, The State-Created Danger Doctrine, 23 TouRO L. REv. 26, 50 (2007)
(explaining that few cases exist in which a plaintiff has actually been able to succeed and
that the plaintiff "really must show" that the official acted with deliberate indifference).
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closest to what is likely the truth about what actually drives these
decisions when it acknowledged that DeShaney was not clear. 184
2. Difficulties in Applying the State-Created Danger Doctrine to
Vaughn
In addition to the general difficulty in applying the state created
danger doctrine, a case like Vaughn demonstrates specific complexity.
In determining whether to grant the defendants' motion to dismiss, the
Vaughn Court applied the Seventh Circuit's three-element test: an
affirmative act, proximate cause, and shocking the conscience.85 While
the elements seem clear enough, applying them to the facts of Vaughn is
difficult.
With respect to the first element, the Vaughn Court reasoned the
state may have increased a danger of private violence by ordering
Vaughn, Jr. to drop his stick, turning a potential danger into an actual
danger.186  The complaint plausibly alleged this, triggering a duty of
protection.187  In doing so, however, the Court noted the Seventh
Circuit's criticizing the term "affirmative act" as unhelpful.188 Several
other circuits include the "affirmative act" element,189 but in this case it
is unclear which act caused the harm-ordering Vaughn Jr. to drop the
stick or standing by while he was beaten. If it is the latter, arguably
standing by was not an affirmative act. It could, however, be considered
"deliberate indifference" in the Sixth or Eleventh Circuits.' 90
In considering the element of shocking the conscience, the Vaughn
Court found that commanding someone to drop his or her mode of self-
defense and then watching from a few feet away as he or she is struck to
death with a bat could qualify.191 However, under the defendants' factual
recitation, contending a chaotic environment and victims lying bleeding
in the streets, it seems reasonable to expect the officers to take action to
assert control, including asking participants to drop potential weapons.
184. Freeman v. Ferguson, 911 F.2d 52, 55 (8th Cir. 1990).
185. Vaughn v. City of Chicago, No. 14-C-47, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107952, at
*4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 5, 2014) (explaining that the state-created danger doctrine has three
elements centered around an affirmative act, proximate cause, and shocking the
conscience).
186. Id. at 5, 8.
187. Id.
188. Id. (citing Slade v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of Milwaukee, 702 F.3d 1027, 1030 (7th
Cir. 2012)).
188. See discussion supra Parts IIB, III.H, 111.1.
189. See discussion supra Parts IIIF, III.K.
191. Vaughn v. City of Chicago, No. 14-C-47, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107952, at
*8 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 5, 2014).
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Asking a riot participant to drop a weapon should not, in itself, be
conscience shocking.
Lastly, in ruling on the motion to dismiss, the Vaughn Court found
that the second element, proximate cause, was underdeveloped and
waived by the defendants,192 but the analysis in other circuits would
include additional elements. The Third Circuit would consider
foreseeability,193 but in a chaotic situation like Vaughn, it is difficult to
apply a foreseeability standard. The Fourth Circuit would require a
custodial relationship,'94 which does not appear to be explicitly present in
Vaughn, although the relationship between a commanding officer and
citizen Vaughn, Jr. could be a "special relationship"'95 in the Second
Circuit. In short, the law's current state in the circuits creates many
questions and offers few answers.
C. Public Policy
In addition to the problems applying the existing tests, two
significant but competing issues arise within the current state-created
danger jurisprudence. These competing issues undoubtedly contribute to
the challenge of determining the doctrine's proper interpretation and
application. State actors, especially those such as police who regularly
operate in tense and dangerous circumstances, rightfully must be allowed
to do their jobs without hesitating to calculate the likelihood of
litigation.196  Most would concede that the average American local
policeman tries to benefit society. Moreover, traditional police action as
a whole within the United States rarely operates with complete and total
cold-blooded delinquency.
197
Nonetheless, tragedy can occur,'98 so it is vital that citizens possess
a mechanism to hold the powerful state responsible for flagrant and
glaring abuses. Such abuses could become worse and more prevalent if
left completely unchecked.199 Underestimating prevailing and latent law
enforcement misconduct can easily occur given the public's inherent
192. Id. (citing Puffer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 675 F.3d 709, 718 (7th Cir. 2012)).
192. See discussion supra Part In.C.
193. See discussion supra Part III.D.
194. See discussion supra Part III.B.
195. See Jonsson, supra note 11.
197. Robert E. Worden & Robin L. Shephard, Demeanor, Crime, and Police
Behavior: A Reexamination of the Police Services Study Data, 34 CRIMINOLOGY 83, 83-
105 (1996) (finding that the use of force in American policing is relatively infrequent).
198. See Gladwell, supra note 175, at 192.
199. See Caplan, supra note 11, at 504 (showing that unchecked police control and
terror is a common and necessary characteristic of totalitarian regimes).
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trust.2° ° With no guidance from the U.S. Supreme Court on state-created
danger theory in 25 years, the circuit courts struggle with this tension.2 °1
That tension arises acutely in the context of a police force. Of all
,occupations within the United States, police officers have one of the
highest rates of illnesses and injuries.202 The job is both mentally and
physically demanding. Officers continuously encounter high-risk
situations involving death and suffering, during which physical injury or
loss of life is possible, whether from conflicts with criminals or pursuing
vehicles.20 3 While earning a relatively modest median pay of $27.40 per
hour, police officers must be alert and ready to react to difficult
situations throughout every moment of their shifts.2°  Police officers
may be paralyzed in their decision-making if the law subjected them to a
strict hindsight standard.20 5 A too-tough liability standard, coupled with
relatively modest pay and the job's inherent risks, could discourage
many people from entering or remaining in the profession. Officer
morale and job performance could drop for fear of overwhelming public
condemnation.2 6
On the other hand, simply forgiving law enforcement officers
regardless of their actions could pose large problems long-term. Absent
sufficient citizen protection, arbitrarily using police power arises.20 7
Abuses ranging from shakedowns to beatings to extrajudicial detentions
often follow. 208 Of course the state-created danger doctrine is not the
best or only mechanism blocking the advent of a dystopian America
200. Fifty-three percent of Americans stated they trusted the police "a great deal" or
"quite a lot." See Confidence in Institutions, GALLUP (June 5-8, 2014),
http://www.gallup. com/poll/1597/confidence-institutions.aspx.
201. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189
(1989), was decided in 1989.
202. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Occupational Outlook Handbook: Police and




203. Jonsson, supra note 11.
206. See Steve Hopkins, Number ofArrests in New York Plummet Over Holidays as
Suspicions Grow of an Organized "Go Slow" by Police Amid Plunging Morale, DAILY
MAIL (Jan. 6, 2015, 11:25 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
2898848/Number-arrests-New-York-plummet-holiday-period-compared-year-suspicions-
grow-organised-slow-police-amid-plunging-morale.html (revealing that police in New
York City were being "very cautious" not to "enrage the public" and most police
precincts' crime tallies were close to zero after weeks of protests against over-zealous
policing).
207. Hank Johnson, State Violence and Oppositional Protest in High-Capacity
Authoritarian Regimes, 6 INT'L J. CONFLICT & VIOLENCE 55, 61 (2012).
208. Id.
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completely controlled by uniformed thugs.209 Yet it would be naive to
dismiss concerns about surrendering to the state this kind of power in any
form. It is significant that an infallible attitude within a police force is
more characteristic of a despotic system than a republican one.210
Tactics used in Ferguson, Missouri and the ensuing manhunt
following the Boston Marathon bombings established a national
discussion about the appropriate boundaries of police action.211 Many
condemned what they interpreted as police overzealousness and
militarization, while others focused on the difficulty and danger law
enforcement faced in these particular situations.2  Finding the right
balance is the challenge.
As with most reasonable solutions, each of the two concerns must
be taken into account to produce the best and fairest outcome. Clearly,
this is the heart of the circuits' struggle. Notwithstanding the resulting
confusingly worded tests, coupled with the sometimes even more
confusing application of those tests, the courts are attempting to balance
the two interests fairly. The circuits want to recognize the possibility of
state-created danger, but do not want to find it too easily. To
appropriately balance the competing interests at stake and eliminate the
confusion surrounding the various state-created danger doctrines, a
uniform test must be imposed.
209.Indeed, video-taping of police officer conduct is increasing, while remaining
subject to uncertain standards of acceptability. See Gericke v. Begin, et al., 753 F.3d 1,
7-9 (1st Cir. 2014).
210. Johnson, supra note 207, at 59.
211. John W. Whitehead, From Boston to Ferguson: Have We Reached a Tipping
Point in the Police State?, LIBERTY BEACON (Sept. 27, 2014),
http://www.thelibertybeacon.com /tag/boiling-frogs-post/.
212. The 2014 Ferguson unrest resulted after police shot an 18-year-old man six
times, killing him. See Ferguson Protests: What We Know About Michael Brown's Last
Minutes, BBC (Nov. 24, 2014, 10:30 PM), http://www.bbc.com/ news/world-us-canada-
28841715. Circumstances were and remain disputed. See id. People protested and
rioted. See A Look at the Destruction After Ferguson Riots, ABC NEWS (Nov. 25, 2014,
10:38 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/US/tour-destruction-ferguson-
riots/story?id=27163962. Police responded with militarized force and imposed a curfew.
See Military Equipment For Local Police Questioned Amid Ferguson Violence, WASH.
TIMES (Aug. 17, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/aug/17/military-
equipment-for-local-police-questioned-ami/?page=all; see Timeline: Michael Brown
Shooting in Ferguson, Mo., USA TODAY (Aug. 25, 2014, 6:54 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/ story/news/nation/2014/08/14/michael-brown-ferguson-
missouri-timeline/14051827. The 2013 Boston Marathon bombing led to an unparalleled
manhunt for the suspect, during which law enforcement created a lockdown in Boston
and ordered its 650,000 citizens to stay indoors. Joe Tanfani, Devin Kelly & Michael
Muskal, Boston Bombing [Update]: Door-to-door Manhunt Locks Down City, LA TIMES
(Apr. 19, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/apr/19/ nation/la-na-nn-boston-
bombing-suspects-20130419.
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V. A PROPOSED UNIFORM TEST
A. Goals and Elements
A uniform test should achieve three things. First, a uniform test
should offer a cohesive, coherent standard for the state-created danger
doctrine. Second, it should dramatically simplify the elements of the
state-created danger doctrine so that it can be applied more consistently,
regardless of the individual set of unique facts. Finally, a uniform test
should delicately balance the interests of protecting the public from
abuse with allowing the police and other state actors a necessary margin
of latitude to perform certain essential public functions without losing
considerable proficiency.
Circuit courts and legal scholars alike have expressed dissatisfaction
with the current condition of the state-created danger doctrine,
recognizing a need for simplification so it can be applied with
consistency.213 Of course, the danger of oversimplification always exists,
and important distinctions could be missed. However, where the
language of state-created danger is circular and adds nothing to
interpretation or implementation, it becomes a hindrance and must be
eliminated in favor of clarity.
The following uniform test addresses these three goals. To establish
a state-created danger claim, a plaintiff should be required to make a
showing that the state actor: (1) materially increased danger (2) in a way
that would shock the conscience (3) of a reasonable person (4) in the
same situation. That the doctrine is called the state-created anger
doctrine should be sufficient to indicate and require that the state must
have actually created or increased the danger in a meaningful way.
Whether that increase resulted from an affirmative ace14 or deliberate
indifference215 is not important. Many of the circuits include the "shock
the conscience" element216 but, as Vaughn demonstrates, context is
important. That context can be provided through the eyes of a
reasonable person in the relevant situation. If these simple elements are
met, the plaintiff has established a claim. Courts would no longer
wrestle with affirmative acts, deliberate indifference, foreseeability,
213. See Slade v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of Milwaukee, 702 F.3d 1027, 1033 (7th Cir.
2012); Chemerinsky, supra note 183.
214. Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94,99 (2d Cir. 1993); Freeman v.
Ferguson, 911 F.2d 52, 54-55 (8th Cir. 1990).
215. Foy v. City of Berea, 58 F.3d 227, 232 (6th Cir. 1995).
216. Forrester v. Bass, 397 F.3d 1047, 1058 (8th Cir. 2005).
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custody, or other special elements217 that simply served as ornaments
along a meandering and long path with no real end.
In this proposed test, the first element, the requirement of a state
actor creating or increasing danger, brings the action within the state-
created danger exception. The second element, conscience-shocking, is
key because it sets a clear standard. The third element, a reasonable
person standard, allows development of an objective body of law that
could be applied to different factual situations. The fourth element,
context of the specific situation, allows a public policy 
balance.21 8
To protect the public from inexcusable abuse at the hands of the
state while simultaneously giving police and other state actors the needed
latitude to perform their jobs effectively, the shocks the conscience
standard is applied simply. Police work's nature in particular is often
hurried and decisions must be made swiftly. 219 As a public safety matter,
police cannot be afraid to act in tough situations. Yet when police or
other state actors act in a deplorable manner, the public should not be
denied every reasonable means to hold them responsible.
The shocks the conscience standard could protect both the public
and the police. It puts the police on notice that even a single individual
citizen can hold the police accountable, hopefully influencing law
enforcement behavior for the better. The police must have certain
leeway within a scope of acceptable behavior and practices to carry out
their duties, but must not be allowed to cross the line into troublesome
methods or roguery. The proposed standard would inform the public that
they do not need to suffer clear mistreatment. The same standard would
equally alert them not to file frivolous lawsuits. By simplifying the
standard and pinpointing the circuits' and DeShaney's core sentiments,
the legal community and the public may better understand this little-
known doctrine.
B. Applying the Uniform Test to the Vaughn Facts
After ruling in favor of plaintiffs in the motion to dismiss, the
Vaughn court issued a summary judgment opinion in favor of
217. See discussion supra Part III.
218. See discussion supra Part V.C.
219. This seems to be what the Third Circuit had in mind with its unique hyper-
pressurized environment standard. In cases like high-speed chases, liability can only
attach when the harmful conduct of the police was intentional. The problem with
adopting this standard across the board, however, would be a tendency for the state to
attempt to portray everything as hyper-pressurized to avoid liability. See Estate of Smith
v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 508 (3d. Cir. 2003).
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defendants.220 The court explained that "[t]he real question is whether
Defendants failed to protect [plaintiff] in a way that shocks the
conscience after disarming him in a dangerous environment.'" 22 1  This
general formulation, while useful in the Vaughn situation, provides
insufficient elemental guidance for other situations.
In essence, however, the court's formulation incorporates all four
proposed elements. First, while the court does not make an express
finding that a state actor created or increased the danger to plaintiff, the
court suggested that police officers "disarm[ed] him in a dangerous
environment.' '222 Second, the court found that "no reasonable jury could
find that Defendants' failure to protect [plaintiff] from an ambush
shocked the conscience.'" 223  This finding incorporates the second
proposed element, shocking the conscience, and the third element, a
reasonable person test. Finally, the court found "Where, as here, police
officers must make an 'instant judgment' about how to deploy their
resources, 'even precipitate recklessness fails to inch close enough to
harmful purpose to spark the shock that implicates [due process
concerns].224  This finding employs the fourth proposed element,
applying the context of the specific situation to allow a public policy
balance.
In short, the proposed four element test yields the same result found
by the Vaughn court while providing generally applicable elements
useful in a variety of situations.
VI. CONCLUSION
Clouded, enormously complicated, endlessly circular, yet confined
to a couple of sentences illustrating a mere afterthought in a first-year
Torts textbook,225 the state-created danger doctrine endures. Almost a
quarter of a century after DeShaney, circuits continue to struggle with its
226proper meaning and appropriate function. Behind the perplexing and
divergent language, most circuit courts agree on punishing state-created
danger while resisting a low standard, due to valid public policy concerns
220. Vaughn v. City of Chicago, No. 14-C-47, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78951 (N.D.
Il. June 18, 2015).
221. Id. at 11.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 12.
224. Id. at 13 (citing Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S.833, 853 (1998)).
225. DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., TORTS AND COMPENSATION: PERSONAL ACCOUNTABILITY
AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY 512 (7th ed. 2013).
226. See generally DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189
(1989).
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that are especially important in the context of police action.
Standardization and simplification would doubtlessly help the courts
with this dilemma. The uniform test proposed herein could do just that.

